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STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM  
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG  
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OSD FOR KIMMITT  
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

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SUBJECT: POLICY ACTION GROUP NOVEMBER 22: ADZ'S AND  
AUXILIARY POLICE

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The November 22 Policy Action  
Group decided to:

- Consider expanding the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) concept to Regional Command - East (RC-East) while maintaining the focus on RC South;

- Limit, for now, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) recruitment, training, and fielding program to Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces.

- Continue discussion of the Strategic Communications way ahead, and;

- Meet in Kandahar during December.

¶2. (SBU) The group assessed that the October agreement between Helmand Governor Daoud and Musa Qala district elders, which has led to the disengagement of ISAF maneuver units from the area, while "still viable," has left space for Taliban influence and intimidation of the populace. During a discussion of ANAP program progress, several international community PAG members registered concern that the Ministry of Interior is failing to recruit police who are representative of the tribal Pashtun districts to which they will be assigned. End summary.

Musa Qala  
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¶3. (SBU) National Director of Security Amarullah Saleh briefed on Musa Qala. He said that the past month has proven that militarily Musa Qala may be viable, but the Taliban still psychologically dominate the area. He cited instances in which the Taliban have violated the Musa Qala agreement: a

family was expelled from Musa Qala for watching television; two visiting ANP were killed; visiting Taliban groups displayed Taliban flags (though no weapons); and schools are only half full with many staying home for fear of the Taliban. The GOA has not yet tested the agreement by pushing official reconstruction assistance or summoning elders to explain and condemn Taliban violations. In Panjwayi and Zharey there have been some Taliban infiltrations and incidents, but the majority of the people still openly support the GOA. It was agreed that the GOA should test the Musa Qala agreement by pushing for safe access for officials and implementation of development projects. ISAF CG Gen. Richards said that ISAF would go back into Musa Qalah, possibly within a month. Saleh invited MOI to send groups to Musa Qala to monitor the real situation. It was also agreed that Governor Daoud should summon Musa Qala elders to explain Taliban violations and prevent their reoccurrence.

ADZs in the East, but the South Remains the Focus  
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14. (SBU) ISAF Commanding General Richards opened this discussion topic by urging expansion of the ADZ concept to RC-East, as well as to RC-North and RC-West, "to counter incipient problems" in those regions. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Deputy SRSG Alexander cautioned against a loss of focus on the south and feeding a popular perception that "the military and not the government is the lead on development." Economic

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Adviser to the President Naderi warned against diverting scarce resources from "an Afghan National Development Plan that is barely working in 10 provinces." Representatives accepted National Security Advisor Rassoul's recommendation that the PAG consider ADZ expansion to the East while maintaining focus on the South.

ANAP: Internationals Worry about Quality  
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15. (SBU) The PAG endorsed the recommendations of a November 11 special meeting of international community representatives co-chaired by Deputy Minister of Interior Khalid and Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Deputy Commander Brigadier General O'Brien. The most important decision resulting from the November 11 meeting was that the Ministry of Interior would immediately cease recruitment, training, and deployment of auxiliary police outside of Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces. The recommendation arose out of gathering international community concern that the expedited development of the ANAP lacked sufficient coalition oversight and quality control. The ANAP effort will be expanded only after the PAG receives a capabilities study which clearly depicts that the assets are in place to properly recruit, train, equip, and pay the recruits in the expanded areas without impacting the effort in the six previously-mentioned provinces.

16. (SBU) Another critical recommendation from the Nov. 11 meeting was that UNAMA would form a team to conduct spot checks on the vetting process used to certify recruits for the ANAP. This arrangement is now in effect and spot checks will commence in Kandahar this week. These should help to assuage the apprehensions of the international community, as well as leading to program adjustments where needed.

GEN Richards counseled against unnecessarily hobbling a promising indigenous force-generation program. Citing a deteriorating security situation in Paktia province, Khalid and O'Brien urged consideration of early deployment of auxiliary police in RC-East. (Comment: Embassy will work with MOI and CSTC-A to evaluate the feasibility of expanding the program to another few provinces. Paktia and Paktika are likely candidates should this occur. End comment.) UNAMA D/SRSG Alexander recommended MOI and CSTC-A shift the focus "from quantity to quality"; Elaborating, he said many alien ANAP "who don't even speak Pashtu" are being introduced into tribal districts where they will arouse hostility. He also noted that the PAG must be convinced that a process exists that will ensure that the ANAP in remote provinces will be paid in a reliable, timely manner. A failure to pay the ANAP will undermine the effectiveness of the entire program and will discredit the GOA. Canadian Charge Colvin requested that MOI,s ANAP enlistment records capture recruits, tribal origins. DCM recalled the Ambassador,s request to Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil that ANAP force composition strive to reflect the tribal and clan balances of the districts to which auxiliary police will be assigned.

Strategic Communications: You, re Not Listening  
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17. (SBU) In the meeting,s closing minutes,

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Information and Culture Minister Khoram strongly criticized the international community for its perceived lack of support for the Strategic Communications (Stratcom) effort. DCM reminded the group that its decision to lodge Stratcom in the Ministry of Information and Culture deprived the effort of the resources and authority of the Presidential communications apparatus. NSA Rassoul promised to continue the discussion at the next PAG meeting. (Note: Embassy and CFC-A are working with the Afghan NSC and the Minister of Information on a proposal to reinvigorate the Strategic Communications pillar of the PAG, given shortcomings in the current structure. End note.)

18. (SBU) To enhance PAG members, familiarity with RC-South issues and convey to that region,s provincial leaders the group,s commitment to establishing stability and the foundations of a prosperous future there, the PAG plans to meet in Kandahar sometime during the first half of December.  
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